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CASE NO. 36540-2009

BRITT G. BURTON
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VS.

STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Respondent-Respondent

Appealed from the District Court of the
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
In and for the County of Benewah.
Honorable FRED M. GIBLER,
Judge

JAMES E. SIEBE
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant
P.O. Box 9045
Moscow, ID 83843
SUSAN K. SERVICK
Special Deputy Attorney General
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P.O. Box 2900
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First Judicial District Court Benewah County
ROA Report
Case: CV-2007-0000461 Current Judge: Fred M. Gibler
Britt Colleen Burton vs. State of ldaho Transportation Department
p r i t t Colleen Burton vs. State of ldaho Transportation Department

*
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Code
NCOC

User

Judge

CAROL

New Case Filed - Other Claims

CAROL

Filing: G3 All Other Actions Or Petitions, Not
Fred M. Gibler
Demanding $ Amounts Paid by: James E. Siebe
Receipt number: 0003102 Dated: 912712007
Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Burton, Britt Colleen
(plaintiff)

APER

CAROL

Plaintiff: Burton, Britt Colleen Appearance James Fred M. Gibler
E Siebe

PETN

CAROL

Petition For Judicial Review

PETN

CAROL

Exparte Petition For Stay Pending Judicial Review Fred M. Gibler

ORDR

CAROL

Exparte Order For Stay Pending Judicial Review Fred M. Gibler

I512007

MlSC

CAROL

Administrative Record For Judicial Review

Fred M. Gibler

11512007

HRSC

CAROL

Hearing Scheduled (Status 12/07/2007 10:30
AM) RE: Petition for Judicial Review

Fred M. Gibler

712007

912812007

CAROL

Fred M. Gibler

-

Notice Of Hearing

Fred M. Gibler

Fred M. Gibler

CAROL

Notice of Petitioner's Request For Preparation Of Fred M. Gibler
Transcript

CAROL

Filing: U - Miscellaneous Fees Use Miscellaneous Fred M. Gibler
Schedule!!!!! Paid by: Rami Amaro Receipt
number: 0003599 Dated: 1111312007 Amount:
$.00 (Cash) For: State of ldaho Transportation
Department (defendan

APER

CAROL

NOAP

CAROL

Defendant: State of Idaho Transportation
Department Appearance Rami Amaro
Notice Of Appearance

Fred M. Gibler

MlSC

CAROL

Supplemental Aency Record

Fred M. Gibler

12812007

MlSC

CAROL

Second Supplemental Agency Record

Fred M. Gibler

1612007

MOTN

CAROL

Motion To Vacate December 7, 2007 Status
Conference And Set Briefing Schedule

Fred M. Gibler

HRVC

CAROL

Hearing result for Status held on 12/07/2007
10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated RE: Petition for
Judicial Review

Fred M. Gibler

I712007

ORDR

CAROL

Fred M. Gibler

1212612007

BREF

CAROL

Order Vacating December 7,2007 Status
Conference And Setting Briefing Schedule
Petitioner's Brief

9212008

MOTN

CAROL

Stipulated Motion To Extend Time For Response Fred M. Gibler
And Reply Briefs Pursuant To I.A.R. 34e

q2312008
Fd

ORDR

CAROL

Order Granting Stipulated Motion To Extend Time Fred M. Gibler
For Response And Reply Briefs Pursuant To
I.A.R. 34c

21812008

BREF

CAROL

Respondent's Brief

Fred M. Gibler

,2712008

BREF

CAROL

Petitioner's Reply Brief

Fred M. Gibler

?572512008

PETN

CAROL

Petition For Scheduling Of Oral Argument

Fred M. Gibler

NOTC

Fred M. Gibler

Fred M. Gibler

3

2

k-;

c-""

4

-

t3ate. 512912009

First Judicial Clistrict Court Benewah County

Nme1 0.24 AM

User CAROL

ROA Report
Case: CV-2007-0000461 Current Judge: Fred M. Gibler
Britt Colleen Burton vs. State of ldaho Transportation Department

@3ritt Colleen Burton vs. State of ldaho Transportation Department

fij

Date

Code

User

1012008

HRSC

CAROL

11712008

HRVC

CAROL

I2912008

HRSC

CAROL

12812008

HRSC

CAROL

NTHR

CAROL

CMlN

CAROL

Court Minutes Hearing type: Status Hearing date: Fred M. Gibler
311312009 Time: 1:00 pm

DCHH

CAROL

ORDR

CAROL

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Fred M. Gibler
0311312009 01:00 PM: District Court Hearing Helc
Court Reporter: Byrl Cinnamon
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages Oral Argument
on Appeal (Rami Amaro to notice hearing)
Opinion & Order RE: Appeal
Fred M. Gibler

CDlS

CAROL

STAT

1312009

411412009

Judge
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
1011712008 02:OO PM) Oral Argument
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
1011712008 02:OO PM: Hearing Vacated
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
01/16/2009 11:00 AM) Oral Argument
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
0311312008 01:OO PM) Oral Argument on Appeal
(Rami Amaro to notice hearing)
Notice Of Hearing (Oral Argument)

Fred M. Gibler
Fred M. Gibler
Fred M. Gibler
Fred M. Gibler

Fred M. Gibler

CAROL

Civil Disposition entered for: State of Idaho
Transportation Department, Defendant; Burton,
Britt Colleen, Plaintiff. Filing date: 411312009
STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Fred M. Gibler

SUBC

CAROL

Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel

Fred M. Gibler

APER

CAROL

Defendant: State of Idaho Transportation
Department Appearance Susan K Servick

Fred M. Gibler

CAROL

Miscellaneous Payment: Supreme Court Appeal
Fee (Please insert case #) Paid by: James E.
Siebe Receipt number: 0004728 Dated:
5/26/2009 Amount: $86.00 (Check)
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 4729 Dated
5/26/2009 for 100.00)
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Fred M. Gibler

Fred M. Gibler

Fred M. Gibler

BNDC

CAROL

STAT

CAROL

LDGD

CAROL

CERT

CAROL

Notice of Appeal Lodged ($15.00 filing fee has
not been received)
Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

APSC

CAROL

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Fred M. Gibler

APDC

CAROL

Appeal Filed In District Court

Fred M. Gibler

CAROL

Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court
Fred M. Gibler
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: Siebe,
James E (attorney for Burton, Britt Colleen)
Receipt number: 0004741 Dated: 5/27/2009
Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: Burton, Britt Colleen
(plaintiff)

Fred M. Gibler
Fred M. Gibler

Fred M. Gibler

SIEBE LAW OFFICES
J A m S E. SIEBE, ISBN 2362
202 E. Second Street
P.O. Box 9045
Moscotv, ID 83843
Telephone: (208) 883-0622
Facsimile: (208) 882-8769

IN

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
BI-UTT COLLEEN BURTON,
Petitioner,
v.

1
1
1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
Respondent.

Case No.

C, \/ Q 7

-

c/ c,

/

ITD File No. 384000014306
Idaho D.L. No. RA355028A
PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL E V I E W

)

Fee Category: C3
Fee: $88.00

COMES NOW, Petitioner Britt Colleen Burton, by and through her attorney of
record, James E. Siebe, of Moscow, Idaho, and pursuant to I.C.

$8 18-8002A(8) and 67-

5270 et seq., hereby respectfully petitions this Court for Judicial Review of the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order dated September 20,2007, by the Idaho
Department of Transportation, in File No. 384000014306. A copy of said final order is

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1

attached hereto as Exhibit A. Said proceeding and final order were entered following a

hearing held pursuant to 1.C. 9 18-8002A.
DATED this

day of September, 2007.
SIEBE LAW OFFICES

A

A d

CERTIFICATE E-SRVICE
I hereby certify that on the
correct copy of the foregoing
following:
Driver Services
Idaho Transportation Dept.
P.O. Box 7 129
Boise, ID 83707-1 129

ay of September, 2007, I served a true and
the following method, addressed to the
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery

(208) 334-8739
(208) 332-2002
Hon. Fred M. Cibler
P.O. Box 527
Wallace, ID 83873

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
ernight Mail
Facsimile
(208) 753-3581

/

I N THE IDAHO TRANSPOWATION DEPARTMENT
STATE OF IDAHO

$53

$85

kg

g2P

@
r-a

IN
THE MATTEROF THE
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF

)
)

IDAHO
D L . N0.RA355028A
FILE M0.384000014306

)

This matter came on for hearing on September 17, 2007, by
telephone conference. James Siebe, Attorney a t Law, represented Burton.
The suspension set out i n the Notice of Suspension served
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 1 8 - 8 0 0 2 ~ 'is SUSTAINED.

EXHIBIT

LIST^

The hearing examiner received the following exhibits into evidence
as part of the record of the proceeding:
1. Notice of suspension and temporary permit
2. Evidentiary test results
3. Sworn statement
4. Incident summary
5. Incident report
6. Copy of citation number 14306
7. Teletype records
8. Copy of petitioner's driver's license
9. Envelope from law enforcement agency
Exhibit A
Page 1 of 10

1O.Ceeificate of receipt of law enforcement documents
11 .Petitioner's hearing request
12. Petitioner's driving record
13.Response to discovery
A. Motion to suppress

B. Memorandum in support of motion t o suppress

The Hearing Examiner has taken Judicial Notice of the
following Items:
1. Records regularly maintained by ITD

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

IDAPA* Rules and manuals
ISP§ standards and procedures" for breath testing instruments

Idaho Statutes
Reported Court Decisions
NHTSA" driving while impaired and SFSTS** testing manual (9/04)

Administrative ~ r o c e e d i n g s ~ ~
Ms. Burton testified :
1. Read Officer Hilton's reason for the stop as noted i n Exhibit 3.
2. Officer Hilton stopped her vehicle while she was driving up a hill on a
roadway.
3. This section of a two-way roadway has a passing lane (left lane) and a
right lane of travel.
4. Her vehicle was being driven within the right lane of travel.
5. While driving up the hill, there was traffic i n the oncoming lane of
travel.
6. A sign indicated the lanes were going t o merge.
7. The sign only showed the lanes merging and did n o t state which lane
would disappear.
Exhibit A
Page 2 of I 0
FINDINGS OF FACTAND CONCI,USIONS
OF TAW

AND O R D E R - 2

8. Not driving beyond the posted speed limit, did not weave the vehicle,
and t h e vehicle's equipment was working before the stop occurred.
9 . Informed the reason for the stop was the failure t o use the vehicle's
turn signals when the two lanes of travel became one lane of travel.
10.The stop occurred after passing the lane merging sign.
11.The vehicle's signals were n o t used after passing the sign.
12.Did n o t know she had to use t h e vehicfe's turn signal when merging
into another lane of travel while driving up a hill.
1J.Not turning the vehicle or turning off the roadway.
Mr. Siebe's comments and arguments:
1. Officer Hilton did not have legal cause for the stop.
2. Officer Hilton did not cite a specific Idaho code.
3. Assumes Officer Hilton was relying on Idaho Gode 549-808(1).
4. Idaho Code 949-808(1) was read into the record.
5. Idaho Code 949-808(1) is unconditionally vague.
6. Idaho Gode 949-808(1) gives inadequate notice t o people o f ordinary
intelligence concerning the conduct t h a t this statute prescribes.
7. This statute fails to give minimal guidelines for law enforcement or
others t h a t enforce this Idaho Code.
8. I n this case, people of reasonable intelligence would not know a turn
signal would be required.
9. The passing lane disappears when the right lane and passing lane
becomes one lane of travel.
1O.A t u r n signal i n this case could be misconstrued and indicate that
Burton was going to turn off the roadway.
11.A roadway's lanes of travel when merging do n o t require a t u r n signal.

Exhibit A
Page 3 of 10

I, having heard the testimony; having heard the issues raised by
the driver; having considered the exhi bits admitted as evidence; having
considered the matter herein; and being advised in the premises and the
law, make the following Findings of Fact:

1
DID OFFICER HILTONHAVELEGALCAUSETO STOPTHEVEHICLE
BURTONWAS DRIVING?
1. Officer Hilton observed the vehicle driven b y Burton fail to use the

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

vehicle's t u r n signals when merging f r o m lane of travel to another lane
of travel as required by Idaho Code 549-808(1).
Idaho Code 518-8002A(b)(ii) does not require a police officer t o state
a specific Idaho code violation in their sworn statement when setting
forth a legal cause t o stop a petitioner's vehicle.
Exhibit 3 is sufficient pursuant t o Idaho Code 518-8002A(S)(b)(ii) i n
describing Officer Hilton's legal cause for t h e stopping the vehicle
Burton was driving.
Legal issues such as those noted in Exhibits A and B are not one of the
issues that an administrative license suspension (ALS) hearing officer
can rule on as provided in Idaho Code 518-8002A(7) and supported by
State vs. Kane (139 Idaho 586).
Burton's ALS cannot be vacated based upon what was articulated i n
both Exhibits A and B.
Officer Hilton had legal cause t o stop t h e vehicle driven by Burton.
Exhibit A
Page 4 of $0

FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CO~\JCT
IJSTONS OF f .A W AND ( - ) R ~ F R- 4

b"

DID OFFICER HILTON HAVELEGALCAUSETO BELIEVE BURTON
CODE5 1 8 - 8 0 0 4 ?
VIOLATED IDAHO
1. Officer Hilton observed Hilton driving a motor vehicle.

2. Burton exhibited the following behaviors:
a. Smelled of an alcoholic beverage
b. Admitted t o consuming alcoholic beverages
c. Memory was impaired
d. Eyes were glassy
e. Eyes were bloodshot
3. Burton met or exceeded the minimum decision points on the following
SFSTs:
a. The horizontal gaze nystagmus
b. The 9-step walk and turn
c. The one leg stand
4. Officer Hilton had sufficient legal cause to arrest Burton and request an
evidentiary test.

3.
DID THE EVIDENTIARY TESTRESULTS
INDICATE
A VIOLATION OF
IDAHO
CODE§ § I S - 8 0 0 4 , 1 8 - 8 0 0 4 C , OR 1 8 - 8 0 0 6 ?
1. The analyses of Burton's breath samples indicated a BrAC.**of

.156/. 152.
2. Burton was in violation of Idaho Code 918-8004.

Exhibit A
Page 5 of 10

4.
WASTHE EVIDENTIARY TESTPERFORMED
IN
COMPLIANCE WITH ALL
REQUIREMENTSSET FORTHIN
IDAHO
CODE,IDAPA RULE,AND I S P
FORENSIC SERVICES SOP?
1. Officer Hilton's affidavit states the evidentiary test was performed in

compliance with Idaho Code, IDAPA Rule, and ISP Forensic Services
SOP.
2. Burton's evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho
Code, IDAPA Rule, and ISP Forensic Services SOP.

5.
DID THE EVIDENTIARY TESTING INSTRUMENT
FUNCTION PROPERLY
WHENTHETESTWASADMINISTERED?
1. The evidentiary testing instrument used t o test Burton's breath sample
completed a valid simulator solution check at 03:49 hours on August
26, 2007.
2. The valid simulator solution check approved the instrument for
evidentiary testing in accordance with ISP Forensic Services SOP.
3. The evidentiary testing instrument functioned properly when the test
was administered.

6.
WAS BURTONADVISED OF THE POSSIBLE SUSPENSION OF HER
IDAHO
DRIVING PRIVILEGE?
1. Burton was played the audiotape version of the Idaho Code 5518-8002
and 18-8002A advisory form prior to Burton submitting t o the
evidentiary test.
2. Burton was advised of the consequences of refusing o r failing
evidentiary testing as required by Idaho Code 5518-8002 and 188002A.

Exhibit A

Page 6 of 10

FINDINGS
OF FACTAND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAVJAPdD C)RnER - 6

CONCLUSION OF LAW
CONFLICTING FACTS, I F ANY, WERE CONSIDERED AND
REJECTED I N FAVOR OF THE FOREGOING CITED FACTS.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, I
CONCLUDE THAT ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES
SET FORTH I N I D A H O CODE fjfj18-8002 AND 18-8002A
WERE COMPLIED W I T H I N T H I S CASE.

THE FOLLOWING ORDER I S RENDERED:

The suspension s e t out in t h e N o t i c e of Suspension served
pursuant t o I d a h o Code 9 1 8 - 8 0 0 2 A i s SUSTAINED a n d
shall run for a p e r i o d of ONE YEAR c o m m e n c i n g on
September 25, 2007, a n d r e m a i n in e f f e c t through
September 25, 2008.
DATED this 2othday of September 2007.

Exhibit A

-

FINDINGS OF FACTAND CONCLUSIONS O F LAWA N D O R D E R 7

Page 7 of 10

P

-

lt

Endnotes
Idaho's Implied Consent Statute
Idaho Transpoflation Department's (ITD hereafter) exhibits are numeric,
exhibits are alpha
*Petitioner's
Idaho's Administrative Procedure Act
Idaho State Police
" Hereafter SOP
" National Highway Transportation Administration
" Standardized field sobriety tests
§§ Argument and testimony is summarized from record of hearing
***
Breath Alcohol Concentration

"

t

Exhibit A
Page 8 of l o

FINDINGS
C7F FACTA NT) CONCT
17SfOhjS OF T . A W

ANn

ORDFR
-8

Pase

/J

FINAL ORDER
(Hearings pursuant to section 18-8002A, I.C.)
This is a final order of the Department.
A motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Idaho

Transportation Department's Administrative License Suspension
Hearing Unit, PO Box 7129, Boise, I D 83707-1129 within fourteen
(14) days of the issue date of this order. I f the hearing officer fails to
act upon this motion within twenty-one (21) days of its receipt, the
motion will be deemed denied.
Or, pursuant to sections 67-5270 and 67-5272, Idaho code, any party
aggrieved by this final order or orders previously issued in this case
may appeal this final order and all previously issued orders in this case
to district court by filing a petition for judicial review in the district
court of the county in which:
1.

A hearing was held;

2.

The final agency actions were taken; or

3.

The party seeking review of the order resides.

An appeal must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the issue date
of this final order. The filing of an appeal to district court does not
itself stay the effectiveness or enforcement of the order under appeal.

Exhibit A
Page 9 of 10

Pie

/ 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
IHEREBY CERTIFY that on t h & a d a y
of September 2007, Imailed
a true and accurate copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER by depositing the same in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

lames E. Siebe
Attorney at Law
PO Box 9045
Moscow, Idaho 83843

Exhibit A
Page 10 of 10

IV,

~ i s f ~ u u 1r 3 ul t-8,X

208

E67 R992

A M A R O LAW

OFFICE

@001/0113

0
Special Deputy Attomey General

ISBA #5848
Attomey for Respondent - Idaho Tran~iportationD e p m e n t
IN THEi DISTNCT COURT OF THE FIRST JULlTCIAL DISWCT OF
TEE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAHT

Case No. CV-07-461
Appeltant,
SUPPLEMENTAL AGENCY

mcom

V.

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARWEW OF
WSPORTATION,
Respondent.

I

COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, Transportation Department
(hereinafter "Respondent'?, by and through its attorney, W

I AMARO of the AMARO

LAW OFFICE, Special Deputy Attorney General, and files with this Court a
supplemental document recently added to the Agency Record. This document consists of
the court reporter's estimate to prepare a transcript of the adminisrative proceeding.
Petirioner has fourteen ( 14) days from the date CIf f iling this estimate w ithin which to
object to or otherwise request additions to the Agency Record. If no objection is made or
addition requested, the record shall be deemed complete and settled as of the foutteenth
( 1 4 ~ day
) after the filing of this estimate. The Petitiancr's brief shall then be due thirty-

five (35) days later and Respondent's brief shall bc duc twenty-eight (28) days after

ru/r8/zuuf

i 3 : O Z FAX

208 667 9992

A N A R O LAW OFFICE

receipt of Petitions's brief,
I hereby certify that, to the best of my bowledge and belief, the enclosd document

is true and comect, and Wt, toge&er with the original Agency Record fiIed in this tnatter,
thc Agency Record filed with this Court is complete. The Department has retained the
original file.
The following is a listing of the docments constituting the supplement to the

Agency Record:
1.

Transcript costs for heasing on September 17,2007.

DATED this

\

day of October 2007.

Special Deputy Attorney General

SUPPLEMEWL AGENCY RECORD-2.
S:\Staxc of IdahoiBumn\P)cadings\Svpplmd Agmy Record (2007 10 09-nd).doc

@ 002/003

IVC IC)/FVU~

13

u1 P A X

@ 003/003

A M A R O LAW OFFICE

2 0 8 657 a992

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEReBY CERTIPi that on the

day of October 2007, 1 caused to be

sewed a true and correct copy of the foregomg by thc method indicated below, and
Adressed to the following:
James Siebe
Attorney at Law
P.Q. Box 9045
Moscow, Idaho $3843

U.S. Mail

-- q-

Overnight Delivery
iiand Delivered
Facsimile (208)

Paralegal to Rami Amaro

SUPPLEMEFITAL AGENCY RECORD-3.
S:\SBic of i & h o \ B u n o n \ P l c a d m q p l m t a i Agency Record (2007 10 09-nd).doc

&- 8
7
q

-fltEO

RAM1 ANARO
Specla1 Deputy Attorney General
P.0, Box 796
Hayden, Idaho 83835
Telephone: (208) 66517551
Facsimile: (208) 667-9992
ISBA #5848
Attorney for Respondent - Idaho Transportation Department

BENEWH COUNTY
J r"r!CHEtE FiEYHtft^BSvCLERh

2807 NO^( 28 bkf \@: S L

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAHI

(

BRITT C. BURTON,

Case No. CV-07-461

Appellant,

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
AGENCY RECORD

,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent,

COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, Transportation Department
(hereinafter "Respondent"), by and through its attorney, RAM1 AMARO of the AMARO
LAW OFFICE, Special Deputy Attorney General, and files with this Court a
supplemental document recently added to the Agency Record. This document consists of
the transcript of hearing on September 17, 2007. Petitioner has fourteen (14) days from
the date of filing this transcript within which to object to or otherwise request additions to
the Agency Record. If no objection is made or addition requested, the record shall be
deemed complete and settled as of the fourteenth ( 1 4 ~ ~day
) after the filing of this
estimate. The Petitioner's brief shall then be due thirty-five (35) days later and
Respondent's brief shall be due twenty-eight (28) days after receipt of Petitioner's brief.
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AGENCY RECORD- 1.
S:\State of Idaho\Burton\Pleadings\SuppletnentalAgency Record (2007 10 09--nd).doc

I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the enclosed document
is truc and correct, and that, together with the original Agency Record filed in this matter,
the Agency Record filed with t h ~ Court
s
is complete. The Depadment has retained the
original file.
Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of the transcript for hearing on September 17,

DATED this

'Q

day of November, 2007.
AMARO LAW OFFICE

I

-MI
AMARO
Special Deputy Attorney General

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AGENCY RECORD-2.
S:\State of Idaho\BurtonWleadings\SupplementalAgency Record (2007 10 09--nd).doc

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Qo day of November 2007, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
James Siebe
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9045
Moscow, Idaho 83843

)e

U.S. Mail
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 883-0622

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AGENCY RECORD-3.
S:\State of Idaho\BurtonWleadings\SupplementalAgency Record (2007 10 09--nd).doc

COPY

I

A P P E A R A N C E S

F o r Ms.

Burton:

JAMES E. S I E B E , E s q .
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P o s t O f f i c e Box 9 0 4 5
Moscow, Idaho 8 3 8 4 3

I N D E X

WITNESS

EXAMINATION BY

B r i t t Colleen Burton
(Petitioner)

Sworn
M r . Siebe ( D i r e c t )
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MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 1 7 , 2007

I

HEARING O F F I C E R :

going t o w o r k n o w .

Okay,

i t i s recording.

Okay,

I ' l l go ahead and

Okay?

MR. S I E B E :

Okay.

HEARING O F F I C E R :

I ' l l c a l l her.

transfer her.

.

I'm

SIEBE:

Okay?

A l l right.

( T e l e p h o n e sounds.}

i

A r e you t h e r e , J i m ?

HqARING OFFICER:
MI.

SIEBE:

Yes.

H ~ A R I N G OFFICER:

M

J

Okay.

( T e l e p h o n e sounds.)

.

BURTON:

Hello?

HEARING OFFICER:

Is t h i s B r i t t B u r t o n ?

MS. BURTON:

it is.

Yes,

HEARING O F F I C E R :

hearing officer.

T h i s i s E r i c Moody, t h e

Hi.

J i m Siebe, i s on t h e o t h e r

Your attorney, M r .

line.
C a n you hear h e r , M r .
MR. S I E B E :

Yes,

Siebe?

I can.

HEARING O F F I C E R :

And, M s .

your attorney?
MS.

BURTON:

I can.

Yes,

3
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Burton,

can you hear

WEARING OFFICER:
ahead and begin.

All right.

I ' m going to 90

Is she going to be testifying today,

Mr. Siebe?
MR. SIEBE:

Yes, she is.

HEARING OFFICER:

All right.

The time is 1:08 Mountain time.
September 17th, the year 2007.

The date is

This is the date and time set

for the Britt Colleen Burton administrative hearing, ID No.
RP1355028A, and date of birth is 3/31/72.
My name is Eric Moody, and I've been appointed by
the Department to hear this matter.
This hearing will be conducted by telephone
conference call as permitted by the Rules and Regulations of
the Idaho Transportation Department and the laws of Idaho.
The hearing is being recorded.
The driver is present; also, her attorney,
James Siebe.
This hearing is being conducted at the driver's
request in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedures
Act and the Idaho Attorney General's procedure (sic).
Statute sets forth specific issues that can be
raised at these hearings, and the burden of proof is upon the
driver as to any issue that is raised.
Mr. Siebe, I have received from the State
Transportation Department exhibits that were marked 1 through
4
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13.

Did you receive these exhibits?
MR. SIEBE:

Yes, I did.

HEARING OFFICER:

Will you be providing any

exhibits into the record?
MR. SIEBE:

I'm going to have my office fax

Yes.

a copy of a Brief and Motion, if I could have them marked

--

if

I could just mark those and fax them after this hearing as
Exhibits 1 and 2.

Do you want them without the alphabetical

--

letters on them?
HEARING OFFICER:
MR. SIEBE:

They'll be alphabet

Okay.

--

HEARING OFFICER:
them.

--

but let our department mark

Okay?
MR. SIEBE:

A and B then?

HEARING OFFICER:
MR. SIEBE:

Yes.

Okay.

And that would be a Motion to

Dismiss or Suppress and a Brief in support of that that we
filed in the criminal case.

Okay?

HEARING OFFICER:
MR. SIEBE:

Okay.

And I'm in Coeur dtAlene, so I'll

have to have people from Moscow send that to you.

If you don't

mind, give me a fax number to send it to.
HEARING OFFICER:

That fax number would be

332-2002.

MR. SIEBE:

Okay.

Great.
5
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I'll do that then.

HEARING OFFICER:

Okay.

And t h a t c o u l d be t a k e n

care of a f t e r t h e hearing.

MR. SIEBE:

Sure.

HEARING OFFICER:

Those w i l l become p a r t o f t h e

record.
Also f o r your information,

I d o have t h e o r i g i n a

e x h i b i t s t h e law e n f o r c e m e n t a g e n c y i s t o p r o v i d e p u r s u a n t t o
Statute.

And a g a i n , b e f o r e I r e n d e r a D e c i s i o n , I ' l l make s u r

t h o s e e x h i b i t s were s u b m i t t e d i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h I d a h o Code an1
a l l o r i g i n a l e x h i b i t s a s r e q u i r e d b y S t a t u t e were s u b m i t t e d .
Okay?
MR.

SIEBE:

Okay.

HEARING OFFICER:

Okay.

At this time,

I ' l l go

ahead and p l a c e B r i t t under o a t h .

BRITT COLLEEN BURTON,
produced a s a w i t n e s s a t t h e i n s t a n c e o f t h e P e t i t i o n e r , b e i n g
f i r s t d u l y sworn, was examined a n d t e s t i f i e d a s f o l l o w s :

HEARING OFFICER:

A l l right.

And y o u ' r e g o i n g t c

have t o s p e a k up j u s t a l i t t l e b i t l o u d e r , make s u r e I c a n h e a r
you a n d r e c o r d you, and a l s o y o u r a t t o r n e y c a n h e a r you.
THE WITNESS:

Okay.

HEARING OFFICER:

A l l right.

b
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Okay?

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. SIEBE:

Q.

Yeah, this is a bad connection anyway Britt, so

anyway, help us out if you don't mind, by speaking up.
A.

Okay.

Q.

Would you tell us your full name, please?

A.

Britt Colleen Burton.

Q.

Will you spell your last name?

A.

B-U-R-T-0-N.

Q.

And where do you live?

A.

In Fernwood, Idaho.

Q.

Okay.

Okay?

Sorry.

Are you the Petitioner seeking to

challenge the proposed suspension of your driving privileges i
this case?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

Now, have you had a chance to review the

materials that we were sent by the Department of
Transportation?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

So you had a chance to read the police

officer's Affidavit of Probable Cause and the attached police
reports?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

I

7
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has those available, but for the record, we've

--

acknowledged, those are Exhibit No. 3 which was attached to the
packet we got from the Department of Transportation, and I

--

furnished those to the

to the Petitioner in this particular

BY MR. SIEBE:

Did you have a chance to read what

the officer said relative to why he stopped you on the evening
in question?
Ms. Burton?

Did you --

I'm here.

--

Q.

Did you -- did you have a

A.

Yeah, I can.

Q.

Did you have a chance to read what the officer

can you hear me?

(Inaudible.)

said was his reason for stopping you on the Probable Cause
Affidavit?
A.

Oh, because I did not signal while merging from a

double to a single lane.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Sorry.

So the answer is, "Yes."

You don't need to tell us what he said.

I'm just trying to clarify some things preliminarily here,
Britt.

Okay?

A.

(Inaudible.)

Q.

So, you read the Probable Cause Affidavit.
8
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And at 2:36 in the morning, were you

Okay.

headed out of St. Maries on Highway 3?

Okay.

This was on the 26th of August?

So you agree with the date the officer put on the
Probable Cause document?

Okay.
where

--

And then why don't you describe for me

where it was that he pulled you over.

milepost 81.
A.

Is that going up a hill?
That's just before.

milepost 81 is, but

Q.

He references

I'm not exactly sure where

--

Well, let's -- let's take a step back.

that I mentioned 81.

Forget

The officer mentioned milepost 81, but if

you don't know, that's fine.
A.

Okay.

Q.

You were pulled over as you were climbing a hill,

coming away from St. Maries.

Is that fair?

A.

Yes.

Q-

Okay.' And was there a passing lane going the

same direction you were going, as well as a lane on the right
of the passing lane?
9
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A

Which l a n e were you i n ?
In the right.
Okay.

And were you s p e e d i n g ?

Was your c a r weaving i n any way?

Was your

--

were a l l t h e

--

was a l l t h e equipment

on your c a r o p e r a t i n g p r o p e r l y ?

Okay.

So

--

and t h e o f f i c e r t o l d you t h e r e a s o n

he p u l l e d you o v e r was b e c a u s e you f a i l e d t o s i g n a l when t h e
two l a n e s became one?
A.

Yes.

Q

Okay.

disappeared.

Now, t h i s means t h a t t h e l e f t l a n e

Is t h a t i t ?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

Now, g o i n g up t h e h i l l

--

I d o n ' t want t o

b e l e a d i n g you w i t h t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , s o l e t m e a s k some
q u e s t i o n s where you g i v e m e t h e answers -- was t h e r e a s i g n
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e l a n e s were g o i n g -- t h a t t h e l a n e s were
merging?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Had you p a s s e d t h e s i g n b e f o r e you a c t u a l l y were

stopped?
10
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A.

Wad I p a s s e d t h e s i g n ?

Q.

Yeah, t h e s i g n t h a t s a y s t h e l a n e s were going t o

b e merging, had you p a s s e d t h a t b e f o r e you were s t o p p e d ?
A.

Yes,

Q.

Okay.

b e f o r e you

--

I did.

Yes.

And d i d you s i g n a l b e f o r e you were

--

o r , d i d you s i g n a l a s you p a s s e d t h a t s i g n ?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

And you understand t h e o f f i c e r t o l d you

t h a t he p u l l e d you o v e r b e c a u s e you d i d n ' t s i g n a l ?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay.

Now, d i d you u n d e r s t a n d b e f o r e t h i s t h a t

you were r e q u i r e d t o s i g n a l a t a l l b e f o r e o r when a p a s s i n g
l a n e d i s a p p e a r s and when y o u ' r e i n t h e r i g h t - h a n d l a n e going up

a hill?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

And t h i s i s two-way t r a f f i c , was it n o t ,

e x c e p t f o r t h e p a s s i n g l a n e and t h e r i g h t - h a n d l a n e going up
the hill?

There was oncoming t r a f f i c i n t h e o t h e r l a n e ?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Whether t h e r e was t r a f f i c t h a t n i g h t o r n o t , t h e

r o a d ' s set up f o r oncoming t r a f f i c .
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

Is t h a t c o r r e c t ?

Now, d i d you a t any t i m e t u r n ?

Did you merge o r e x i t from t h e highway?

11
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YOU were already on the highway from the time You
left St. Maries, I take it?

Okay.

And then did the sign tell you which lane

disappeared or did it just show that the line

--

that the

--

the lanes merged?
It just showed that the lanes merged.

MR. SIEBE:

No further questions.

(The witness was excused.)
HEARING OFFICER:

Your arguments.

MR. SIEBE:

I

Yes.

--

I think there was

insufficient cause to pull her over.
The -- our position is he didn't cite a specific
statute, but I'm assuming he was relying on Idaho Code
49-808(1), which states that no person shall turn a vehicle
onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a highway
or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the
movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving
an appropriate signal.
And it's our position that if that is the
Statute, in fact, that was applied in this particular case,
that the Statute is unconstitutionally vague.

It fails to give

any adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence
12
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concerning the conduct it prescribes, and fails to establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must
enforce the Statute.
From our perspective, drivers of reasonably or
presmably ordinary intelligence would not understand the need
to give a signal when all they're doing, as she did, is
continuing straight when the, actually, the passing lane
disappears even though both lanes become one.

And, certainly,

signaling could actually give the wrong impression that you
were actually getting ready to leave the roadway when you're
not.

And there should be no need to signal when the highway

leaves no choice whatsoever, no more than you would have to
signal if a highway took a

--

an angle off to the right or went

around one of those, I don't know what

--

how to describe them

other than a roundy-round, but one of those go-arounds like
they have in Europe and in New Zealand where you go around and
then take one of the spikes or one of the streets that come off
of a circular drive as you're going down the road.
And from this perspective, given the totality of
the circumstances, if that is why the officer pulled her
over

--

and he doesn't say in his -- in his report here, which

I think is also fatal, you know, what he's relying on other
than the fact that she didn't signal when the highway merged
from two lanes to one -- that Statute's unconstitutional.

But

I think you could find this defective in terms of cause for
13
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pulling her over by not articulating more specifically why it
was he pulled her over.
He observed no driving pattern other than this
supposed failure to signal, and she's testified that there was
nothing in her driving pattern independently that would warrant
being pulled over.
So, for that reason, we ask that you not sustain
the suspension.
HEARING OFFICER:
MR. SIEBE:

Anything else?

No.

HEARING OFFICER:

With that, I'll review the

record and I'll get a written Order of my Decision out to you
in the mail.
MR. SIEBE:

Okay.

HEARING OFFICER:
the

Thank you.
And could you hold on while

-(The hearing concluded.)

14
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE O F IDAHO)
)

ss.

County of Ada )

I , WENDY J. MURRAY, a N o t a r y P u b l i c i n and f o r
t h e S t a t e of id ah^, do hereby c e r t i f y :
T h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g h e a r i n g was manually
t r a n s c r i b e d by m e from compact d i s c r e c o r d i n g , and t h a t t h e
t r a n s c r i p t c o n t a i n s a f u l l , t r u e , and v e r b a t i m r e c o r d of t h e
s a i d h e a r i n g , t o t h e b e s t of my a b i l i t y .
I f u r t h e r c e r t i f y t h a t I have no i n t e r e s t i n t h e

event of t h e a c t i o n .
WITNESS my hand and s e a l t h i s 2nd day of
November,

20 07

.,,V,.-

'*+$or
t h e S t a t e ohfdaho,
$39 a t Herriman, Utah.
:a~I$$,&?&uriission e x p i r e s 2-5-2008.
Idaho CSR No. 475.
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M THE DISWCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D I S m C T OF
TkE STATE OF IDAHO: IN AND FOR TEE COUNTY OF BENEWAH

1

BTCITT COLLEEN BmTON,

)

1
1

Petitioner,

P

.
, ,

-

.

Case No. CV-07461

.
,

COMES NOW the above-named Petitioner, Britt Colleen Burton (hereafter

"Rurton") by and through her attorney of record., and presents to tfie Court the following
brief.

I.

KT
k;
6$$

i1; ~ %

A.

ISSUES TO BE APPEALED

Whether I.C. 5 49-808(1) is mconsti~tionallyvoid as applied to this case

because it fails to provide fair notice that signaling is appropriate when roadway design

L*
i

*

r

"d

necessitates merging from two fanes into one.
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p:

-

PETTTIONER'S BRIEF 1

632

PAGE

B.

'Whether LC. 9 49-808(1) is mcons~tutionaflyvoid as applied to this case

because it fails to establish minirnal guidelines as to what is an "appmpriate signal" ta

govern enforcement of the statute.
XI.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Aupst 26,200'7, at approxiinately 2:36 a.m., ~urtonwas traveling out of St.
Maries, Idaho, on Highway 3. A.L.S. Hrg. Transcr. 9:3-10 (Sept. 17,2007). The
highway was a two-way highway. Id. at 16-19. As the hi@way climbed a hill, it had a

leR-hmd passing lane and the regular right-hand lane in which Burton was traveling. Id.
at 9:20-10:3. As Burton dimbed the hill, she passed a sign indicating that the lanes were
going to merge. M.at 10:18-23. The sign did not indicate which lane ended but only that

the lanes were merging. Id, at 12:5-8, Burton did not signal when she passed that sign
because she did not understand that she was required to signal when a passing lane

disappears and she is traveling in the regular, right-hand lam going up a hill. Id. at 11:57; 11:lI-15.
Shorlly aRer the left passing lane ended, Burton was pulled over by Deputy Sidney

E. Hilton (hereafter ""Hilton'" of the Benewah County Sheriffs office. .Id at 10: 15-17; R.
003. Nilton told Burton that fie pulled her over because she failed to signal when the

two lanes became one. ALS Krg. Transcr. 10:11-14, 1I :8-XO; R. 003. At no time did

Burton turn or exit the highway. ALS Hrg. Transcr. 11123-1234.
A subsequent investigation by Hilton led to a charge of DUI, and Burton was

served with a Notice of Suspension for Failure of Evjdentiary Testing. R, 001-003, In

PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 2
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accordance with stamtory provisions, BWon requested an admimisQativehearing on
August 29,2007. R.0 18-021,

The administuative heaxing was conducted on Septe~~ber
17,2007. R. 027,045.
Burton testified at the hearing as described above. ALS Hrg. Trmscr. 6:16-!?:lo.
Burton ofired as exhibits the Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support, which
she had filed in Benew& Comty District Court relative to her DUI charge. AI;S Hrg.
Transcr. 5:3-65; R. 03 1-044. Said motion and memorandum in support argued that X.C.

3 49-XOS(1) i s unconstitutionally void as applied to Burton because it fails to provide fair
aotice that her conducted is proscribed by the statute and it fails to establish minima1

guidelines to govern enforcement of the statute. R. 03 1-044. Burton's argument relied

on fhe Memorandm Decision and Order of Fi Ah District Magistrate Judge Israel, which
was attached to the memorandum k support as Exhibit A. R. 042-044,
In paragraph 1 of his Xjin&ngs of Fact, Administrative Hearing Examiner Eric G .
Moody (hereafter "'Moody") stated that Burton's void for vagueness argument was not
one on which an ALS hearing officer could rule and that he could not vacate Burton's
license suspension based on that argument. R. 048. Therefore, he held that Elton had
legal cause to stop Burton and sustained the suspension of her driver's license. R. 048,

051.
IIX.

STANDARD OF fUEVXEW

On judicial review, the District Court may set aside the administxative hearing
officer's decision if the Court determines that the agency's findings,inferences,
conclusions, or decisions were, among other things, in violation of constitutional or
PETTTIOf6ER7SBRIEF - 3
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statu't'olly provisions. I.G. $67-527913). This includes arpmenb that a staate or
ordinance on, which the agency's decision relied is void for vagueness. See Cman v. Bd

MCommissioners ctfFP.ema~ttGomty,Docket No. 30061 (2006); Duportt v. Idaho State

Board of C~mmissiovters,
134 Idaho 6 18 (2000).
IV.

DZSCWSSXON

The due process clause of the Fobeenfi Amendment to the U.S.Constitution

requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be "worded with sufficient clarity and
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" and that it
be '"worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."
State v. Korsen,13 8 Idaho 706,7 11 (2003).

Therefore, a statute i s void for vagueness if it "'fal[sJ to provide fair notice that the
defendat's conduct was proscribed or faills1 to provide sufficient guidelines such that
the police had unbridled discretion" in enforcing the statute. Id, at 712. The statute
involved in this matter, I.C. 5 49-808(1) is unconstitutionafly void far both of these
reasons.
A statute is facially vague if it is "impermissibly vague in ajl of its applications,"

i.e. invalid in toto. ld. Howwer, even if a statute is not facially vague it may still be
vague "'as

applied" tto a particular defendant's conduct. Id. Burton is not arguing that

I.C. $j49-808(1) is facially void but, rather, that it is void as applied to her conduct.

-

PETITIONER'S BRIEF 4

05

SXEBE: LAW OFFICFc

A,

PAGE

1.C. 8 49-.808(1) is Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to This Case Because
It Fails to Pravide Fair Notice that Sigflalinig is Appropriate When Roadway
Design Necessitates Merging from Two Lanes into One.

I.C. 5 49-808(1) states:
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or:
left upon a highway or merge onto ox exit from a highway unless and until
the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an
approp~aksigal.
In Sfate v. Dwbre, 133 Idaho 663,666 (Ct, App. 1.999), the comt heId that failing

to signal. at the end of a passing lane constituted "movement'" and violated this stahte.
However, as pointed out by Fifth District Magistrate Judge Israel, the court was divided

and its opinion sent mixed signals. See Mizmorundm Decision a~tdOrder, State v. Dale,
Blaine Comfy Case No. CR-2007-0783dated June 6,2007, R.042443.
As Judge Xsrae1,'s decision points out, the Dewbre court refused to consider
whether the statute was mconst-itutionallyvague because that issue was not raised below,
See Dewbre, 13 3 Idaho at 667. Mthough Chief Judge Perry's opinion states that I.C.4
49-808 is plain and unambiguous, as Judge Israel states, this does not rule out an as

app1,icdvagueness argument or there would have been no reason for the court to
specifically leave that argument open.. See Meinorandurn Decision and Order, R. 043,

Despite Chief Judge Perry's statement, I.C. 8 49-808 is hardly plain and
unmbiguous, or, if it is plain and unambiguous, it can be palpably absurd
as applied to many situations. Is weaving within a lane without a turn
signal a violation of the statute? Is swerving to avoid a deer without a turn
s i p d a violation of the statute? Xs going around a bend in the road
without a turn signal a violation of the statute? Consistent wit11 Judge

BF;
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Perry's reslsonhg, the answer is yes, yet aalmost no one would apply the
statute to these situafions.

Id. at 43.
The divided nature of the D m h opinion, itself, supports Defendant's zwment
that the stamte is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the pGsent case. In the main
opinion, Chief Judge Perry states that he is 'konstrahcd" to find thctt the defendmt's
action violated the statute "until further cladftcation i s provided by the Idaho legisla~re."
Id. at 666.

In addition, in his concurring opinion, Judge SchwMman points out that '"any

an Idaho driver would, in custom and practice, see no need to operate a turn signal in this
hypm-technical situation." Id: at 667. Therefore, even Judge Schwartzman would agree
that the statute does not give adequate notice to Idaho drivers of 'presumably ordinary
htelligence" h t a signal is required under the circumstances of thjs case. See
Memorandm Decision and Order, R.043-044.

This is reiterated in the dissmting opinion of Judge Pro Tern McDemott in which

he states that common sense dictates that rhe word'hmove'% the statute "does not
require a driver to signal where the driver, obeying tbe posted traffic sips, remains in the
A@t-hand lane uatil the highway's structure forces the driver ro merge" into the
remaining lane and that such a requirement "may confuse, rather than alert, other
drivers."

M.at 667-668.

Further, because the term '"appropriate signal" is not defined in the Idaho Code, a
person of ordinary intelligence is left to wonder when a signal is appropriate and,
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therefme, required, Thai vameness d o c h e does not require every word in a criminal
statute to be slamtofily dcftned. State v. Casano, 140 Xdabo 461,464 (Ct. App. 2004).

However, 'k statute must be construed so that effect i s given to every word and clause of
the statute'band Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the

approved usage of the language." Dmbre, 133 Idaho at 656. Therefore, effect must be
given to the word "appropriate'"

it is used in this statute.

"Apppropriate" is defied as 'kuitabie or fitting far a particular purpose, person,

occafion" ( h ~ : / / m . d i c t i o n ~ . c o m
accessed
,
Sept. 5,2007) or "suitable for the
occasion or ciremstarrces" (http://m.encarta.rnsn.com, accessed Scpt. 5,2007).

Therefore, inclusion of the word "appropriate" in the statute implies that there are
situations in which the use of a signal is not appropriate. The situations quoted above
from Judge Tsrael's Memorandum and Decision makc clear that there arc: mmy situations

in which a signal is not necessary or appropriate. However, because the statute provides
no definition of the term "appropriate signal," (cg. when 0 t h traffjc is present and your
"movement" could impede or interfere with their c4movement"),people of ordinary
intelligence are left to wonder when a signal is appropriate. fn fact, there are many
situations, including the one presently before the court, in which "the appropriate signal
under the circumstances was just as likely no signal at all." See Memorandm Decision
a d Order, R. 044.

Burton was wavering in the right-hand lane of a highway that narrowed Erom two
lanes to one. l[nerefbre, the design of the highway fforced Burton to merge into the

remaining lane. There was no other trafec in the vicinity at the time whose travel was

08
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potentially impeded or hterfered with by Burton% action. Therefore, it is 1Wy that the
"appropriate signal" in this situation was no signal at all. However, because the statute

fails to provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence whether the terns "movement"
and "appropriate signal"' include such situations, it is unconstitutionally vague as applied
to this situation and, therefore, void.

B.

I.C. 5 49-80811) i s Unconsetutionally Vague as Applied to This Case Because
it Fails to Provide Sufficient Guidelines as to When a Signal is Appropriate
Thereby Giving Poiice Unbridled Discretion in Enforcing the Statute.
A law that does not provide min.ima1guide1,i.n~~
for enfarceinent "'impemissibly

delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad

hoc and subjective basis, with the anendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584,586 (1990). This failure to provide minimal
guidelines for d o r m e a t is often "what tolls the death knell" for a statute. Id. at n. 4.

This is "perhaps the most meaninghl aspect o f the vagueness doctrine." Id. (quoting

Smith v, Oog~en,415 U.S. 566, 574 (1.974)).
Xn Ritt, a city loitering and prowling ordinance was struck down as failing to
provide sufficient enforcement guidelines. 118 Idaho at 590. Undm ~ , mdi,nance,
E
a
person could not be arrested or convicted unless he failed to identie himself and offer an
explanation for his presence and conduct. Id However, the ordinance did not provide

any guidelines for what constituted credible and reliable identif,cation.and, therefore,
gave police officers coinplete discretion to make that detemination., .lid at 589-590.
Although that ordinance was found to be facially void, the reasoning is cqually applicablc
in this "as applied" vagueness challmgc.

-
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Similar to Bin,I.C. 6 49-808(1)'s use of the phrase "appropriate signal" without

providing further enforcement guidelines impermissibly gives officers complete
discretion to decide who is and who is not violating the statute. Although a facial
challenge of I.C. fi 49-808(1) might aot prevail because there are obvious situations in
which a person o f ordinary iatelligence would understand a signal to be appropriate, the

statute i.svague as applied to Burton's conduct,
As discussed above, the situations quoted h r n Judge Israel's Memorandum and
Decision demonstrate that there are many situations in which a signal is not necessary.

Not only does the statute's failure in defming the phrase "appropriate signal" leave a

person of ordinary intelligence wondering when a signal is "appropriate," this failure to
provide minimal guidelines provides police with unbridled discretion in determining

whether the statute has been violated. As noted by Judge Israel, '%he minimal guidelines
meant to establish the enforcement of the law are at best in flux." See Memorandum

Decision and Order, R 044.
Therefore, I.C. § 49-808(1) is unconstitutionaf ly vague as applied to Burton
because it fails to provide minimal guidelines as to when a signal is appropriate thereby

giving police oGcers unbridled discretion in enforcing the stature.

-
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CONCLUSION

Because LC. 5 49-808(1) is void for vagueness and because Moody relied on that
statute in making his decision that the officer had legal cause to stop Burton, his order

sustaining the administrative suspension of Burton's driver's license should be vacated.
DATED this&day

of December, 2007.

I hereby certify that on tho $hkday of December, 2007, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated and addressed to the
following:

Rani A m o
Attorney at Law
P.0. Box 796
Hayden, ID 83835
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RAM1 AMARO
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TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISWCT OF
THE STATE OF TDAFIO, XN AND FOR THE COTJNTY OF BENEWAHX
BRXTT C. BURTON,

Case No. CV-07-46 1
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATE OF PDAHO, DEPARWEW OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

I

COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho Department of Transportation, by and
through its attorney of record, RAM1 AMAIIO, Special Deputy Attorney Genemi, of the

M R O LAW OFFICE, and hcrcby respedfi~fiysubmits Responden't's Brief.

I..

WTRODUCTIOM

This case atism &om the Idaho Transportation Department's (hmeinafier "the
Depa~nent")suspension of Petitioner Brih C. Burton's (hereinafier "Appellant" or

"Burton'") driving privileges. Burton requests tb,e reversal of thc Dqauttneni's order
suspending her driving privileges. The Department requcsts that this Court uphold the
suspension.
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FACTUAL Al'?D PROCEDUUL BACKGROUND

On or about 2:36 in the morning, on A u p t 26, 2007, Deputy $Sidney E. Hilton
fi~einafier""Dquty Wilton", while patrolling Highway 3, obsexved Appdlant fail to
signal whcn merdng lanes. At that point, Deputy 1-lilton proceeded to stop Appcllmt's
vehicle, d m to the m m a r in whic11 she was driving, at milepost 81. Page 1-5 of the

administrative record.
Deputy Hilton approach& the vehicle, identified Appellant via her driver's
license, and infomed her a~ to the reason for the stop. Appellant then infanned Dcputy
Hilton that she never signals when merging. During this exchange, Dguty Wilton
noti~eda strong odor of alcohol emmating &om, the vehicle and thus asked Appellant if
she had been drinking, in response to which Appellant admitted that she had consum&

two beers. Td.

Deputy Hilton then requested that AppeIlant gubmit to a series o f Eeld sobriety
tests, to which she consented. Deputy Nilton proceeded said several field sobricty tests,
including the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus bereinafter "HGN"'), the %walk-and-turny'
evaluation, and the "one-leg stand" evaluation. Appdlant fai.led all three tests, and was

then placed undcr arrest for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol bereimfier "DUB').
During said arrest Appellant insisted that she would be okay if simply allowed to r e m
to her home. Id.
Deputy Nilton transported Appellant to the Benewah County Sheriffs
Dcpartmmt, where he proceeded to check her mouth for my fore@

objects or

substances. He then played the advisory tape while waiting the required fifteen minutes.
After the required wait period, Appellant submitted to two tcsb, with r d t s of ,156and

tlRe$pondeat's Brief
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,152 respedvely.

Appdlmt was &ereaAer cited for a DUI, notified of her license

s q c n s i o n and released, Jd.
Appellant later rqucsted an adminismt;ivc rcvicw, which revim was complctd
with the Wearing Officer apholding the silspmion on Sqtmbcst 21, 2007. Appellant

then requested this judicial review on September 26, 2007. Pages 18-21; 60-62 of the
administrative record.
111.

HE-G

EXAMINER'S mRXIVGS OF XiAC!'I'AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW
-

After reviewing the submitted evidence, os listed on pages 45-47 o f the

adminishtive record, the Hearing Examiner madc thc following pertinent findings of
fact and conclusions of law on page 48 of the administrative record.
I.

Deputy Nilton observed the vehicle driven by Burton fail to use the
vehicle" turn gignals when merging &om lane o f travel to another lane of
travel as requircd by Idaho Code 49-808(1).

2.

Idaho Code does not require law enforcement to state a specific code

vjolatim in their sworn statement when setting forth a legal cause to stop a
petitioner's vehicle.
3.

Exhibit 3 is sufficient pursuant to Idaho Code 18-8002A(5)@)(ii) in
describing Deputy Hilton's legal cause for stopping the vehicle Burton

was driving.
4.

Legal issues such as those noted in Bxhibits A and B are not one of the
issues that an administrative license suspension ( A U ) hearing officer can

rule on as provided in Idaho Code 18-8002A(7) and supported by Stat6 v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3IRespondent's Brief
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Burton's ALS c m o t be vacatcd bascd upon what was articdatd in both

Exhibits A and B.
6.

Deputy Hilton had legal came to stop the vehicle driven by Burton.

A party aggrieved by the decision of a hearing officer may seek judicial review of

the decision in the manner provided for in judicial review of Enat agency action as
provided in Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code. I.C.

5 18-8002A(8). "[J]udicial review of

disputed issues of fwt must be confined to the agency record for judicial review

...

supplemented by additional evidence take pursuant to section 67-5276, Idaho Code." I.C.
(i 67-5277.

The scope of review is such that "[tlhe court shall not substitute its judgment for

that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." LC. $ 67-5279.
The standard for review of on administrative decision is fbrher el.aborated:
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or
(3)
by other provisions of law to ism an order, thc court shztll aRtm the
agency action unless the oourt finds that the agency's findings, inferences,
c~nclwions,or decision$ are:
(a)

in violation of constj.tutiona1or statrutoty provisions;

(b)

in excess of tho statutory authority of the agency;

(c)

made upon unlawfuX procedure;

not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole; or

(d)

(e)

arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion,

I f the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole ox $
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
. .. .

41Respondent7s Brief

. . .

.

*

..

.

Not*thstmding the prouisiow of subsections (2) and (3) of this
section, a g ~ n ~a~tians
y
shall be afgrmed unless mbstantial rights of the
appellant have been prgudiced.

(4)

LC. 4 67-5279.
If the hearing e x a e e r " findings me clear, concise, dispositive, mpportd by the
evidence, a . not affected by m r s of law, the findings should be uphdd by the Corttt.

See Van Orden v. State Dep't vfHealth d2 Werare, 102 Idaho 663, 667, 637 P.2d 1159,
1163 (1981).
V.

TSSUES ON APPEAL

The issue$ raised by Appellant in her brief are limited to the following:

Whether I.C.$49-808(1) is unconstitutionally void as

1.

applied to this case.because it fails to provide fair notice that signaling is appropriate

when roadway design xleoessitates merging fiom two lanes into one.
Whether I.C. 6 49-80&(1) is unconstitutionally void as applied to this case

2.

because it fails to establish minimal guidelines as to what is an "appropriate signal" to

govern enfozemmt of the statute.
Appellant argues that Appellant's szzspension may be set aside by this Court based
on Appellmt's arpmmt &.atthe D e p m e n t relied on a statute or ordinance that is void
for vagueness.
VI*
A.

ARGUrnNT

Standard of Review
The Idaho Adrni.nistrative Procedure3 Act (IDAPA) governs the review of

department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or r e s ~ cat person's
driver's license. I.C.49-201,49-330,67-5201 and 67-5270. A court reviewing at1 agency
....................

.................................
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decision cannot mbstitute its j u d ~ mfor
t that of the agmcy as to the wej&t of the
evidence praented. Raaer, the court mugt dejFer to the agmcy's findkgs of fact unless
they are clearly monmus. In other words, the agency's factual detminations are
binding on the r&ewkg court, cvcn where there is conflicting evidence before the
agency, so long as thc d e e a l i i o n s &raresupported by $ubstfmtiafcompetent
evidmce in the rccord. In Re Su~ensionof Driver's License, 143 IdAa 937
(App. 2006) 155 P.3d 1 176.
A reviewing court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings,

inferences, concXmions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or comtitut;od provisions; &)I
excmd the agency's staatory authority; (c) are made upon unlawi%lprocedure; (d) are

not suppotted by subsmtinl evidence in the record; or (t3) are arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion. LC. j 67-5279(3), The party challmgng the agency decision must
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. 8 67-5279(3) and that a
substantial right of that patty fias been prejudiced. In Re, supra. If thc agency's decision is
not a % r d on appeal, "it sh.al.1be set asidc ... and remanded for further procedkm as
necessasy." I.C. # 67-5279(3).
B.

ANALYSIS
The administrativelicense mspension (ALS) statute, I.C. 8 18-8002A, requires

that the Idaho Tritnsportation Department (ITD) suspend th,e driver's license of a driver

who has failed a BAC test ndministcrcd by a law enforcemmt offieex Y,r.eperiod of
suspension is ninety days for a driver's first failure of an evjdentiary tmt and one year .For
any subsequent tmt hilure within five yew. I.C. § 18-8002A(4)(a). A person who has
.

,,

... .,.
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been notifid of s u ~ an
h administrative license suspension may request a hearing before a

hearing officer designated by the ITD to contest the suspension. I.C.5 18-8002A(7). At
the administmtive hean'ag, the burdm of proof rests upon the driver to prove my of the.

grounds to vacate the suspension. I.C. 9 18-8002A(7); In Re, supra. The hearing officer
pust uphold the sumension unless he or she finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the driver has shown one of several gmunds enumerated in LC. 8 18-8002A(7) fur

vacating the suspmion. Those g o u ~ d include:
s
(a) The pence offimr did not have legd cause to stop the person; or
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to belicve the puson had bem driving or was in

actual physical control of a vehicle whiIe under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other
intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18.-3W4C or

18-5006, Idaho Code; or
(c) The test rr;sults did m t show an alcohol concentration or the presence ofdrugs or

other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 123-8006,

Idaho Code; or
(d) The tests for aIcohol concentration, dm@ or othm intoxicatiry3 substances

adtninisterd at the di.rectionof the peace oEcer were not conducted in accordance with
the requirements of section 18-8004(45, Idaho Code, or the tasting equipment was not
hnctioning properly when the test was administered. . . .
The b.wring officer's decision is subject to challenge through a pation for
judicial review. I.C. 4 18-8002A(8}: In Re, supra. Presumably, Appellant is arguing that
due to the alleged w,constitutiondity of I.C. 49-808(1), that Deputy Hilton did not have

OE3/15
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legal cause to stop Appcllmt, thereby constituting a basis on which the Hearing
allegedly should have sat aside thc wpmsion of Appellant's driver's lliccmse.

C.

Legal Cause
Appellant presumably argues that D~putyWilton lacked legal cause to

$top Appellant. Pursmnt to I.C. 18-8002A(7), it was A ~ e l l m t vburden
s
to prcscnt
evidence aEmativcly showing that the Dquty Hilton lacked legal cause to stop

Appellmt's vehicle,
A trafEc stop by a member of law e n k r m e n t constituta a seizure of the

vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendmat's prohibition against
umeasonable searches and seizurw. In Re, supra. Under the Fourth Amendment, a
mmbcr of law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal
behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven
contrary to traffic laws. The reasomblaess of the suspi~ionmust be waluatt?d upon the
totality of the cirwm~tmcesat the time ofthe stop. The reamable suspidon standard
requires less than probable cause but more &an m a c speculation or instinct on tb,e part of
the officer. A manber o f law enforcment may draw reasonable inferences firomthe
facts in his or her possession, ao,dthose i.nferencasmay be drawn from the member's
experience and law enforcement training. Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the

conduct observed by the officer fell within the broad range of what can be described as
normal driving behavior. Id.
The hearing officer properly concluded that Appellant failed to prove that the
Deyuty Hilton lacked le8al cause to stop Appellant. Deputy H i l t o ~observed Appellant
...
fail to signal while changing lanes via metgin$ on Highway 3, despite the fact that there
.........

"

........

"

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .".......". ............................ ............,.I "" . ‘ . . . . . . .

$ [ ~ e s ~ o n d e n tB
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was obviously a rnmber of law enfor~mmtin

c behind Appellant. The

that Deputy Hilton was proper in stopping Appellmt's vehicle to irrvestigate possible
criminal behavior. DquV Hilton's action was proper as at that point there was a
rmonablc and aGiculablc suspicion that the vehicle was b&ng driven contrary to traRc
laws. It was Dquty Hilton's understding that it was a ~olntionof traffic taw to
chmge lanes and/or merge without signaling which undemtanding was based upon his
baining and expdence. Basing Deputy Hilton's action in $topping Appellant on the
toblity of the circumstances at the time of the stop, Deputy Hilton's suspicion was
rwonable, md consisted of more than mere speculation or instinct.
Apellant appears to argue that Deputy Wilton did not have probable cause or
reasonable suspicion necessary to makc a legal traffic stop. However, in sitnations such
as these, probable came to believe the law has been broken outbalance3
private intwest in avoiding police contact. Whrm v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,817-1 8
(1 996). An member of law mforc-ement may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible

cn'minal behavior if there is n reasonable and dculable suspicion that the vehicle is
being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 41 1,417(1981),

Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are objective tests. Ncither test depends on the
individual officer's subjective thoughts nor upon the bases offered by the state to justifjr
the stop. Deen v.$fute, 131 Idaho 435,436,958 P.2d 592,593 (1998) (reasonable
suspicion); State v. Muphy, 129 Idaho 861,863-64,934 P.2d 34,3G-37 (Ct.App. 1997)
(probable muse). Thus, in detaining whether a trafFic stop constituted a lawful seizure,
courts fieely apply relevant law to the objective facts presented, uncoustrclincd by law
enforcement's c m w a t c d reasoning. ''hisprevents costly rcsort to the excXusianasy mte

PAGE
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where a police o%cer or prosecutor merely fails to articulate the approMatejusti8m~on
for an o h w i s e legal search or seizure. Sbnie v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554,558,

Vn1idit.y of I.C. 49-808[1)

D,

AppdIant, in this case, argues that I.C. 49-808is suffjicientlyvague to be

unconstitutional and therefore invalid, p ~ m m a b l yresulting in a Iack of probable cause
for stop, and a basis oh which the Hearing Officer could vmate Appellant's suspmsion.
Appellnnt attempts to reach this Same point via an q p n e n t that as the statute is
unconstiWtiond, that the Hearing Officer committed revasiblc error by relying on it,
thereby warranting this Court's reversal of the Hearing officer's decision.
Of the two Idnho cascs which intefpret I.C. 49-808, neither explicitly examines

whether the statute is unconstitutional.

In the first, which is most similar factually to the

case at hand, Appellant contended that the offim lacked the requisite suspicion to stop

his vehicle because 1.C. $49-808did not rquire the use of signals when entering or
exiting a passing area. The Court in that case examined the issue, finding as follows:

"The relevant portion 0fI.C. § 49-808 providef that no person "shall turn a vehkk or
move right or leji upon a highway unless and until the movement cant be made with
reasomble safety nor without giving an appropriate signal." Dewbre contendp tho1 I. C.$
49-808 requires #heuse ofhun signals only when o vehicle i u m or makes u lane change.
.Dmbre conlends that he did not turn or change lanes, that he contintred in the same lane
while entering atid eriting the pussing area, and that he, therefore, wa,?n ~ required
t
to
use his signal. Dewbre also argues that LC. $ 49-808 requires the use ofsigMIs only
when uppropria& and thai no turn signal is the ffappr~priate
signuZ" w h e ~the vehicle
movement can be made with reasonably safity.
This Court exercises free review over the upplicufion and contbvcnon of statutes. Stlrte
v. Schumacher, 131 Idnho 454. 485, 959 P.Zd 465, 466 (Cl.App. J998). Generally,

'ywjord$ aJphrares are cdnsWed according to the context and the approved usage of
the language." I.C. $ 73-113. A stuhrte murr be construed so that efeccr is given to every
word and c k w e of a stabte. State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416 417-18. W 3 P.2d 768.
..

.
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769-70 (Cr.App. 1999). The task ofthe court "in interpreting the meaning o f l a ~ p a g e
eontairned in a statute is to give efect to the le@i~ture's intent and puvose." State v.
Coleman, 125 Idaho 466, 469, Bf 5 P.2d 28, 31 (Ct.App. 1996). mere LL no occmionfor
construction where the h a m e Page 666 ofa stahte is plain and unambisow. State v.
MizCoy, 128 fdalzo 362, 363, 913 P.2d 578, 781 (19961. "Theplain, oliviotrs avtd ratioml
meaning is always prefcmed to any hidden, narrow or irraiional meaning." State v.
Arragmith, 132 Idaho 33, 40, 966 P.2d 33, 40 (Ct.AppP1998),
The fata~tguageoj-I.C. $49-808 is plain and unambipow and must be given efect. The
following holding fvom the district court's order afimdng the ma@@ate1s dersiai of
Dewbre's suppression motion correct!y analyzes the stahrteic application: ??%enDewbre
approached like portion ofthe highway containing a passing lane, the sign rquired him
to " k e p right accept 80 pass." As such, Dewhre moved his vehick to the right to comply
with this requirement, When Dewlire reached the end ofthe portion of the highway that
cotzrained a passing lane, !he record clearly establishes that there was a sign requiring
Dewbre to merge back into the lefi lane. 212;s required a bming moverrzent to the lej?. Xf
is undisputed the [sic] Dewbre made these movements, and it is also undispertad that he
did not signal when he made either turn. By failing to signal when he made these turns,
Dewbre violated I.C. 5 49-808.
It i~ ~ n r ethat at the p i n t Dewbre made these turning mmuvm; the dashed line did not
separate the le$ and righr nodhbound lanes. However, the statute does not strictly limit
its application to the lane changes. Instead, the statute requires a signal whensver an
individwl make$ a "move right or lefi upon a highway.' Had the legislature intended
only to regulate t u r n and lane changes, it could have stated so spec($cally. By moving
first right, and the~zleftl Dewbre c a m within the ambit ofthe statute, and war required
to make to [sic] s i p a l
I am constrained to agree. Upon entering the passing arm Dewbre moved his vehicle to
Ihe right in ordot- to comply with the highwcry signage. Upon exiting the passing area,
Dewbre moved his vehicle to the lep, complyiybg once again with the highway
signage, There are no exceptions in I.C. f 49-808 to the signal requirement. State v.
Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 279, 954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct.App. 1998). Whenever a
movment is made to the left or right an a highway, regnrd1ess ofwhether the ilrovemenf
is made necessary to comply with highway signage, an
appmpriate signal is required purszcant to I.C. § 49-808.
I do not attempt by this holding to deJiMe the boundwies ofwhat constilutar a "movement
to the right or 1cJi' upon a highway." 1conclude on& that Dewbre's movements placed
him withia the ambit ofthe statute. Until fidrther clarajsca~onis provided by the Idaho
legi,clature, I urn const~ainedto hold that whenever a vehicle movcs to the right or to the
lej2 becawe one lane splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into one lane, an
appropriate signal is required pursuant to I.C. 49-805. Therefore, I.C. $ 49-808
required Dewbre to use an appropriate signal when he moved to the right while entering
the passing area and the^ to $h"heleftwhile exiling [hepassing area.
11IResponden.t's 'Brief
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Dewbre further argues that no sl'gnal is the appropriate signal when the vehicle
movemeat
be m d e with redsonabb safity. The plain Ianguczge 0fl.C. $ 49-808
provides that an individual may ''move righi or leg? upon a highway" if two rquirements
are met: (I) if "rhe movement can be made with recasonabte safety" and (2) iJ "an
apjoropriale sigiaal" is given. Even i f a vehicle can be moved with redsonable safe& LC.
$49-808 still veqwires the use o f t a m signals when m l d ~ the
g movement to the right or
Ie?. Fwthemore, the Idaho legislature spec$cally amended the turn sigvral Law dekting
the exception Dewbre arpes. Prior to the amendment, fhe staute provided that ran
appropriatg sipal w s only required "in the event any other traflc may be aflected by
such movement." 1953 Idaho Sess. Caw 507. This exceptio~was removed in 1977 by the
ldrzho legislature. 1977 Idaho Sem. Law 370. Comeguently, the legislahre intended that
turn signals Ac used when moving right or left on a higkwq regardlass ofwhether other
traflc may be meted or a vehicle is moving with reasonabk safety. f agree with the
dbtn'ct court that an appvoprinte signal requires "such a sigttal as wouldput others Page
667 on notice ofthe driver's intention ta ma& a hcming mowment, and that it way not
the intent ofthe legislature to negate the requirement of signaling when making a ~ n i ? t g
moventent.I f
Sta.tc v. Dcwbre, 133 Idnho 663 (App. 1999).

Appellant argues that the statute is so ambiguous as to be unconstilutiondly

vague. However, the Idaho Appellate Court,in the above opinion, specifically held that
"the laizguage Q ~C,
L $49-808 is plain and unambiguow and mwt be given eflect ".The
Idaho AppetIate Court M e r found that, pursuant to I.C. 49-808, a driver must signal

when. changing Ianes or when merging. Id. If that statute were so vague that such
detmnatjon codd not be made, such a holding would be unlikely.'

-

statute is neither void for vagueness nor facially vague either pursuant to
the standards set forth in the State v. Korscn case, or standards set fort11 in the State v.
Bitt m e . It does not fail to set forth minimal guidelines for en.forcmmt. Nor does it fail
to provide fair notice that a particular conduct is proscribed.
Further, thc Hearing Officer in this matter had no auth.ority to detmnine
whether the statute was unconstitutional or void. The Hearing Of'fictcer's duty was to

'

Notc that the Appellant in this cilsc did not intraduoc cvidenoc similar ta &st introduced by Dewbre in
terms of signage and vehiclc movement.

12IRespondcnt's Brief
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uphold the suspension abswt certain proofs8 which burden AppeIlmt failed to mwt.
Amellant pzmumably ar&es onc of two issues: First, that the Hearing Officer made his
decision based on invalid or unconstitulional law; Next, that the H e h g O E c a
pesumably should havc held the stop to be without cause based on an identical argument
regarding the stlute at issue. Thc error is said a r m e n t is that the Hearing Officn based

his opinion on cuncnt, valid law which had been upheld in a near idcm~calsccnario. The
Hmdng Officer had no authority to d m said taw invalid.

VII.

CONCLUSION

This Court's review is now confined to the agency record. Idaho Code tj 67-52??.
This Court cannot substicute its judgnmt for that of the agency as to the weight of Ule

evidence or questions of fact. Idaho Code 8 67-5279. This Court shall affirm the bearing
decision, mlcss it finds that the hearing examiner's findings: (1) violate constitutional or

statutory pravisions; (2) e x c d statutory authority or are made upon unlawful procedure;

(3) are not suppoYeed by the substantial evidenoc on the whole; or (4) a x arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Id. Notwithstanding the existence o f my of the
afo~ementionedgrounds for reversal, this Court shall also affirm the agency action if tbe
subsmtial rights o f the appellant were not prejudiced.
Appellant has not shown to this court that the hearing examiner's findings are i t 3
violation of statutory or constitutional provisions, that they exceed statutory authority,

that they are made upon unlawful procedure$that they are not supported by substantial
evidence on the whole, or that t h y are srbieary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Nor has the Appellant shown that any of her substantial rights were prejudiced.
Tllerefore. thc Department respcctfilly requests that this Court uphold the decision of the
131Respondent3s Brief
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hearing examiner in this man&, and leave the suspension of Appellant's license

undismrbed.

DATED this 8* day of February, 2008.
A M M O LAW OFFICE

Special Dcputy Attorney General
ldaho Trmgportation D e p e e n t

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY C E R T W that on the 8' day of February, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method iodiulted below, aid addressed to the

following:
James Siebe
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9045
IMascaw, Idaho 83543

- U.S. Mail
- Overnight Delivery

- Hand
Delivered
Faesimilc (208) 883-0622
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XN TEE DISmCT COURT Ol?THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
'IT33 STATE OF IDAflO,IN AND FOR 'J3-E C O m T Y OF BENEWAH

BRITT COLLEEN BmTON,

1
)

Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF Z M O ,
WSPORTATION RWARTWm,

Respondent.

1
1
1
)
)

Case No. CV-07-46 1

PETXnOmR"S MPLY
BRIEF

1
1
1

C O N S NOW the above-named Petitionex; Britt Colleen Burton (hereafter
"'Burton.") by and though her attorney o f record, and presents to the Court the following

reply brief.
Respondent's Brief can be broken down into three arguments: 1) that the statutory
vagueness argument is not properly before the court; 2) that I.C. 5 49-808 is not
unconstitutionaIly vague; 3) a substantial right of Burton was not prejudjced. All three of
these arguments are erroneous, an.d this reply brief will, address each of them in turn.

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF - 1
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Under 1.C.

PAGE

S\ 18-8002A(7f, hsufficient legal cause to stop the driver is one of the

gounds on which a hearing oMicer may vacate an ahiniseative l i c e w suspension. A
detemination of whether the stop of a vehicle is lawful includes an malysis of whether
the s a k t e on which the stop was based was zsmnstitutional. Therefore, such an analysis
i s a necessw part of tfie hm1-i.ngexamher's inquiry and the hearing examiner does have

statutory au&ority to make such an analysis subject, o f course, to judicial review.

In addition, administrative proceedings that apply general rules to specific
individuals, interests or situations, are quasi-judicial in nature and subject to due process
constraints. Cooper v. Bd. of County Commissioners o p d a County, 101 Idaho 407,4094 X 1 (1 980); Cowan v, Bd. of Commissioraers ofFrsmonr County, 143 Idaho 50 1,148 P.3d
1247, 1256 ( 2006). See also American f i l l s Xeservoir Dis. No. 2 v. 171eIdaho Dept. of

'liyaterResawces, Docket Nos. 33249/33311/33399 (2007) (referring to tbe "quasi-

judicial functions" of administrative bodies).
At an adminisb"ati.velicense suspension hearing, the heating examiner applies

general rules to the individual and situation before it. Therefore, the hearing is quasijudicial and is subject to due process constraints. These due process constraints include
whether the statute on which the administrative action is based is unconstitutionally
vague. See Cowan at 1259-60; Dupovat v, Moho $sate Board ofCommissioners, 134

Idaho 618,623 (2000); American Falls Reservoir Dis. No. 2.

.pETJTIONFJB'S REPLY BRIEF - 2
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Purthct, in Idaho, due process is not satisfied d e s s judlciaf review is provided
from the decision of an administrative agency, Northern Frontier h c . v. Stttte, 129 Idaho
437,439 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Graves v. Cogwell, 97 Idaho 716 (1976)). If the
statutory scheme for ITD administrative hwitl$s (which scheme incIudes, in
combination, LC.5 18-8002A(7) and IRMA) does not provide for constitutional
challenges at either the administrative hearing level or on judicial review, the scheme
itself violates the procedwal due process rights of drivers. Therefore, the hea~ng
officersTmdings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions could be ovemmed as being
made upon unlawfi! procedure. X.C. $67-5279(3)(c).
While LC. 65-5279 does require that the reviewing court defer to the agency's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, a determination of whether a statute is

void fur vagueness is not a question of fact. Rather, the constitutionality of a statue is a
question o f law over which appellate courts exercise free review, See American Fulls
Resentair Dis. No.2; MDS Invclstments, LLC v. State, 138 Idaho 456,461 (2003). The

District Court is acting in an appellate capacity for judicial review of this administrative
decision and, therefore, the question of whether I.C. tj 19-808(1) is unconstihltionally

vague is properly before the court and the court exercises fiee review over the issue.

B.

I.C. 5 49-808rI) is Uncomsti~~ona1X~
Vague as Amlied to This Case.
This argument was filly addressed in Petitioner's Brief filed on December 26,

2007. Therefore, Petitioner directs the COW to that brief and will not repeat that
argument in its entirety h a . However, Petitioner would like to make the Following

points:

-
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Respondent sbtes in its brief that ""Appellmt q e s that the stalute is so
ambiguous as to be unconstitutionally vague." See Respondent" Brief, p. 12 (Feb. 8,

2008). This statemenl implies that Burtoa is arguing that the statue is facially vague.

Hwever, Petitioner's Brief sets forth. the differences between a 'Yacially vague"
arwment and a '"vague as applied'' argument and clearly states that "Burtan is not

a r p h g that I.C. $49-808(1) is facially void but, rather, that it is void as applied to her
conduct."
The Dewbre court's satement that the sbtute is "plain and u n m b i g u o u s ' ~not
~

contrary to an "as applied" vagueness argument. In ordtx to be facially vague, a statute
must be '"mpemnissibly vague ia all o f its applications." State v. Kotsen, 138 Idaho 706,

712 (2003)' There are situations to which I.C. $49-808(1) clearly applies (such as
mtehg or exiting a highway) and, therefore, the statute i s not facially vague.
Howt:ver, even if not facially vague, a statute may stilt be uncaxxstitutionally vague
when applied to a specific situation. Id. In Dewbre, the traffic stop based on the
defendant's failwe to signal when the highway's structure forced him to merge from two
lanes to one was "a barely plausible traffic stop." Dewbre at 668, J. Schwa&man,
concurring opinion, n. 2. Yet, the court specifically stated that it was declining to address
the issue of whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague because the defendant had
not raised the argument below. Id at 667.

Further, in J. Schwartzman's concurrjng opinion, he agreed in the result (that,
again, was not based on a vagueness a r ~ m e n t "despite
)
the fact that many an Idaho

driver would, in custom and practice, see no need to operate a turn signaI" in such a

-
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h y p e r - t e c ~ c dsituadon. Id. at 668. He dso painted out his o\vn obsemations that

individuals rarely signal in such a situation. Id, n,2. These comments by him indicate
thag had a vagueness challenge properly been before the court, J. Schw@mzm would
have at least considered the possibility that the statute did not give adequate notice to
people of ordinary intelligence ~oncerningthe condud it proscribes and may have been
void for vameness as applied to that situation.
Again, vapeness was not properly before tbe Dwbre cowt and, therefore, was
not addressed by the court. Id. at 667. I-Iowever, it was addressed by Fi* District
Magistrate Judge Israel in State v- X-TarriscrnMat~havBale, Blaine County Case No. CR2007-0783. See Memoradum Decision an$ Order, R. 042-044, There, in a situation

very similar to the one presently before the court, Judge Israel's reasoned holdjng was
that I.C. 5 49-808 is "palpably absurd as applied to many situations" itlcIuding a situation

such a3 when highway structure: forces a driver to merge from two lanes to one, Id. at 43.
Judge Isreal's holding that the statute was vague as applied is supported by the divided
nature of the .Dwbre opinion, the particular comments referenced above made by J.
Schwastman in his concu&g opinion, as well as the dissenting opinion of J.

NcDemott.
I.C. (j 49-80861) requires an 'kppropriate" signal, and mles of statutory
interpretation require that the word "approp~ate"be given effect. Dewbm at 665. As set
forth in Petitioner's Brief, "appropriate" i s defied as ''suitable or fitting for a particular

purpose, person, occasion'~(http:lIm.dictiona'y.com,accessed Sept, 5,2007) or

om,
"suitable for the occasion or circumstances" ( h t t p : / / ~ ~ ~ . e n c ~ . m s n . caccessed
PETTTIOFER' S REPLY BREF - 5
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Sept. 5,2007). Therebe, Jnclusion of the word "appropriata" in the sQtute implies that

there are situations in which the use of a signal is not appropriate.
As e x p l a b d in Judge Israel's opinion, there are many sihations in which a signal

is not necessw or appropriate even though the driver is engaged in "movement" on the
highway. However, because the ststute provides no definition of tho term "appropriate
signal,'" (e.g. when your "movement" could impede or iaterfere with the "movement"o f

another vehicle), people of ordinary intelligence are left to wonder when a signal is
appropriate. In fact, there are many situations, including the one presently before the
court, in which 'We appropriate signal under the circumstances was just as likely no

sipd at all ." See Memorundm Decision and Order, R. 044.
Further, the failure to define when a signal is appropriate "impemissibly delegates
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries far resolution on an ad hoc and

subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."
State v. Bit?, 118 Idaho 584,586 (1990). The failure to provide minimal guidelines as to

when a signal is appropriate Yells the death knell" for this statute because providing
guidelines is "perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine." Id. at n. 4.
In Bitt, tfie Court found statute before it vague because it did not define what
constituted credible and reliable identification and, therefore, gave law enforcement
complete discretion in that determination. Id. at 589-90. Although Birt dealt with a
facially vague challenge, whether the statute supplies sufficient guidelines is also part of
an "as applied" vagueness inqu j. Korsen at 7 12. Therefore, Bifr i s applicable to the

present case.
b5
be*
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As pohted out by Judge Israd, there are mmy sirnations in which the

"appropriate" signal may be no signal. However, because the statute fails to provide any
guidelines, law enforcement had wbridled discretion to determine whether a signal was

appropriate in this situation. Therefore, LC.8 49-X08(1) is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to Burton because it fails to provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence
whetha a signal is appropriate in situa~onssuch as the one before the court. Further, the

statute is unco~lstitutionallyvague as applied to Burton because it failed to provide law
enfoxcment with minimal guidelines for determining whether a signal was appropriate in

this situation.
C.

Burton's Substantial Due Process Rights Were Preiudfced-.
1TB's rtndjngs, inferences, conclusions, or decisions can be overturned on judicial

review if they violate I.C. 8 67-527913) and if they prejudiced a substantial right of
Burton.
Because a statute that i s void for vagueness fails to give adequate notice of the
behavior proscribed and/or fails to provide minimal guidelines to those enforcing the
statute, the void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept. US.v.
Professional Air Traflc Covltrcrlleps Qrgunizath, 188 F.3d 531 (I st Cir. 1982);

H~tchimv. D.C., 188 F.3d 531 @.C. Cir. 1999).
There is no question that an individual has a substantial right not to be deprived of

life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The violation o f a procedural due
process right constitutes prejudice of a substantial rights under I.C. 4 67-5279. Although

few Idaho cases contain specific discussions on whether a substantial right was

-
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prejudiced by an agency action or decision, many caes cite this standmd and then End
For the petitioner based on various violations of the stahtte. Therefore, these cases can be
interpreted as holding that those violations o f the statute constimed prejudice of a

substantial right of the petitioner.
In Fr;rcher v. City o f K e f c h m ,the Court held that the planning and zoning

cornmission had violated Fischer's procedwd due process rights. 141 I W o 349,355
(2005) (sbting that actions such as those by the commission weakened or possibly

nulljfied imested parties' rights to a public headng), Although it did not specifically
state that a subsmtid right of Fischer had been prejudiced, the Court did cite the
"prejudice of a substantial ri&t'>standwd contained in1.C. 67-5279(4)and held that
Fischer was the prevailing party in the dispute. Id. at 352-353,356. Therefore, this case

can be interpreted as holding that a procedural due process violation prejudices a
substantial right of the party,
In Bacret v. Bower Corn@, the County appealed a district court ruling in favor of
Eacret and other petitioner's. 139 Idaho 780 (2003). The Court found that the

petitioners' pmcedural due process rights were violated because one ofthe planning, and
zoning commissioners had made statements indicating bias and the inability to judge the
matter fairly and had engaged in ex parte mmmunications resulting in evidence that was
not available lo the entire Board or equally to the parties. Id. at 786-787. Therefore, the
Court affirmed the district court ruling in favox of petitioners. Id. at 787. Again, the
Court did not specifically state that a substantial right of the petitioners was prejudiced.

However, it cited the 'prejudice of a substantial right" standard contained in LC. 9 67PfiT1T10NERY
S REPLY BXlEF - 8

PAGE

SIEBE LA& M;FICr-

5279(4) a d upheid the district court's ruling. Id, at 784, 787. Therefore, this case also

can be interpreted as holding that a procedural due process violation prejudices a

substantial right oF&e party.
In Cooper v. Board ofBi"~f8xsionalDiscipline ofldaho State h'oard of Medicine,

the Court held that the Board violated Cooper's due process rights by disciplining him for
behavior of which he did not have specific notice. 134 Idaho 449,454-455 (2000)
(holding that Cooper's due process rights were violated because he was not given specific
notice in the complaint of a11 charges brought against him and fir which he was
disciplined). Although the Court's sling in Cooper's favor was also based on another
violation by the Board, because it cited thc "prejudice of a substantial right" standard
contained in I.C. $67-5279(4) and ruled in Cooper's favor, this case also can be
interpreted as holding that a procedural due process violation for failure of notice
prejudices a substantial right of the party.

Burton has a substantial due process right that has been prejudiced by her being
disciplined based on a statute that is vague as applied to her situation and, therefore, did
not provide notice that it was applicable to her behavior.

DA'IED this$ $day

of February, 2008.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
B R I T C. BURTON,
Appellant.
CASE NO. CV-2007-461

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent,

OPINION & ORDER RE: APPEAL

I
I

Appellant Britt Burton seeks judicial review of respondent ldaho
Transportation Department's order suspending her driver's license.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In re Suspension of Driver's License of Gibbar, 143 ldaho 937, 941-42,
155 P.3d 1176, 1180-81 (Ct.App.2006) sets out the applicable standard of review
as follows:
The ldaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the
review of department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend,
disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's driver's license. . . . This
Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence presented. This Court instead defers to

OPINION & ORDER RE: APPEAL -1-

the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In
other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the
agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial
competent evidence in the record.
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or
constitutional provisions;
(b) exceed the agency's statutory
authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The party
challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency
erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. If the agency's
decision is not affirmed on appeal. "it shall be set aside . . . and
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." I.C. § 675279(3).
(Citations omitted.)

Burton's challenge to the suspension is centered upon a contention that
ITD erroneously found that the stop of her vehicle by Benewah County Deputy
Sheriff Sidney Hilton, just after 2:30 a.m. on August 26, 2007, was based upon
legal cause. In re Suspension of Driver's License of Gibbar, supra, states:
The administrative license suspension (ALS) statute, I.C. § 188002A, requires that the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD)
suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a BAC test
administered by a law enforcement officer. The period of
suspension is ninety days for a driver's first failure of an evidentiary
test and one year for any subsequent test failure within five years.
person who has been notified of such an administrative license
suspension may request a hearing before a hearing officer
designated by the ITD to contest the suspension. At the
administrative hearing, the burden of proof rests upon the driver to
prove any of the grounds to vacate the suspension. The hearing
officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of

OPINION & ORDER RE: APPEAL -2-

several grounds enumerated in I.C. $ 18-8002A(7) for vacating the
suspension. Those grounds include:

(a) The peace ofticer did not have legal cause to stop the person
#...
The hearing officer's decision is subject to challenge through a
petition for judicial review.

A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's
occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the Fourth
Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible
criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. The
reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the
totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. The
reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause
but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer.
An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or
her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the
officer's experience and law enforcement training. Suspicion will
not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell
within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving
behavior.
id. 143 Idaho at 942-43, 155 P.3d at 1181-82 (citations omitted).
ITD found that Officer Hilton stopped defendant for moving left on the
roadway without signaling, in violation of I.C. § 49-808. Subsections one and two
of that provision state:
( I ) No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway
unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety
nor without giving an appropriate signal.
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required
shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlledaccess highways and before turning from a parked position, the
signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds
and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred
(100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.

OPINION & ORDER RE: APPEAL -3-

Burton argues that I.C.

g 49-808 is void-for-vagueness as applied to her.

She does not contend that I.C.

49-808 is void-for-vagueness in all of its

applications. State v. Korsen, 138 ldaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (Idaho 2003) states:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This
doctrine requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be worded
with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and that the statute be
worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly
defined. Furthermore, as a matter of due process, no one may be
required at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning
of penal statutes. This Court has held that due process requires
that all "be informed as to what the State commands or forbids" and
that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the
meaning of the criminal law. A statute may be void for vagueness if
it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence
concerning the conduct it proscribes, or if it fails to establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must
enforce the statute.
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face
or as applied to a defendant's conduct. For a "facial vagueness"
challenge to be successful, "the complainant must demonstrate that
the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." In other
words, the challenger must show that the enactment is invalid in
toto. To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a
complainant must show that the statute, as applied to the
defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the
defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient
guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in
determining whether to arrest him. A "facial vagueness" analysis is
mutually exclusive from an "as applied" analysis.

Id. 138 ldaho at 711-12, 69 P.3d at 131-33 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). State v. Schurnacher, 136 ldaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct.App.2001)
states:
An appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute
that will uphold its constitutionality. A statute's possible infirmity for
vagueness may be avoided by a judicial construction of the statute
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that is consistent with legislative intent and comports with
constitutional limitations. When interpreting a statute, we begin
with the supposition that the legislature intended the ordinary
meaning of the words it used unless a contrary intent is clearly
expressed.

Id. 136 ldaho at 519, 37 P.3d at 16 (emphasis added).
Burton contends that I.C. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague as applied
to her because it was impossible for her to know whether I.C. § 49-808 required
her to signal under the circumstances then present. First, Burton focuses on the
statutory requirement of a signal when a vehicle "movejs] . . . right or left upon a
highway." Burton contends that the traffic sign present, "indicating the lanes
were going to merge," "did not indicate which lane ended." Petitioner's Brief, at
2. ITD did not make a specific finding agreeing with Burton that the sign did not
indicate which lane ended. Instead, ITD focused on Burton's responsibility to
merge, stating:
Officer Hilton observed the vehicle driven by Burton fail to use the
vehicle's turn signals when merging from [her] lane of travel to
another lane of travel as required by ldaho Code § 49-808(1).
Decision at 4; Record at 48.

ITD's finding is supported by Deputy Hilton's

affidavit, which states:
I observed a vehicle (license # 3B34991) fail to signal when it
merged lanes.

When I made contact with the driver, I advised her why I had
stopped her. She stated . . . "I never signal when I merge lanes."
Affidavit, at 1-2; Record at 3-4.

ITD's finding is also supported by Burton's

testimony at hearing, where Burton admitted the sign "showed the lanes
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This result is consistent with State v. Dewbre, 133 ldaho 663, 991 P.2d
388 ( ~ t . ~ pIp
9 .~ 9which
) ~ held:
The language of I.C.
be given effect.

5 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must

whenever a vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one
lane splits into two lanes, or 'two lanes merge into one lane, an
appropriate signal is required pursuant to I.C. g 49-808.

Id. 133 ldaho at 666, 991 P.2d at 391.
Finally, Burton contends, "Inclusion of the word 'appropriate' in the statute
implies that there are situations in which the use of a signal is not appropriate."
Reply at 6. Burton's interpretation might be valid if the statute required a signal
"ir or "when" appropriate. Instead, the statue requires an "appropriate signal."
The word "appropriate" is an adjective describing the type of signal required. In
other words, the statute requires a signal, but not just any kind of signal. It
requires the type of signal given be appropriate. For example, an appropriate
signal for a leftward movement on a highway would be the activation of the left
blinker, and an inappropriate signal for the same movement leftward would be
the activation of the right blinker. Here, Burton gave no signal, appropriate or
otherwise. Accordingly, it is clear that Burton failed to give an appropriate signal
as contemplated by the statute, and this language is not unconstitutionally vague

* It is noted that the result herein is consistent with Dewbre because, as that court stated, it did
not consider the issue of whether the statue was unconstitutionally vague, as Dewbre had not
raised it below. Id. 133 ldaho at 667, 991 P.2d at 392.
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as applied to Burton. Again, this result: is consistent with Sfafe v. Dewbre, supra,
which held:
Dewbre further argues that no signal is the appropriate signal when
the vehicle movement can be made with reasonably safety. The
plain language of I.C. § 49-808 provides that an individual may
"move right or left upon a highway" if two requirements are met: (1)
if "the movement can be made with reasonable safety" and (2) if
"an appropriate signal" is given. Even if a vehicle can be moved
with reasonable safety, I.C. § 49-808 still requires the use of turn
signals when making the movement to the right or left.
Furthermore, the ldaho legislature specifically amended the turn
signal law deleting the exception Dewbre argues. Prior to the
amendment, the statute provided that an appropriate signal was
only required "in the event any other traffic may be affected by such
movement." 1953 ldaho Sess. Law 507. This exception was
removed in 1977 by the ldaho legislature. 1977 ldaho Sess. Law
370. Consequently, the legislature intended that turn signals be
used when moving right or left on a highway regardless of whether
other traffic may be affected or a vehicle is moving with reasonable
safety. I agree with the district court that an appropriate signal
requires "such a signal as would put others on notice of the driver's
intention to make a turning movement, and that it was not the intent
of the legislature to negate the requirement of signaling when
making a turning movement."

Id. 133 ldaho at 666-67, 991 P.2d at 391-92.3
Burton has not shown that I.C. § 49-808, as applied to her conduct, failed
to provide fair notice that her failure to signal was proscribed or failed to provide
sufficient guidelines such that Officer Hilton had unbridled discretion in
determining whether to stop her.

3

Accordingly, I.C. § 49-808 is not

Although Judge Schwartzman, in his concurring opinion in Dewbre, questioned whether any
driver would be able to fully comply with traffic laws, he concluded: "[Sjince the officer had some
objective measure of probable cause to believe that Dewbre violated the traffic code, the stop
would now be constitutionally reasonable and justified." Id. 133 ldaho at 667, 991 P.2d at 392.
Although, as advanced by Burton, Fifth District Magistrate Judge Ted Israel in State v. Dale,
Blaine Co. case # CR-2007-783, disagreed with the ldaho Court of Appeals decision Dewbre, this
court is bound to follow it to the extent that its rationale is applicable. See Record at 42-44.
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unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton, and ITD's finding that Officer Wilton

had legal cause to stop defendant for violating that statute is not in error.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: ITD's decision is affirmed.
DATED this

/ D avt- day of April, 2009.

fl
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FRED M. GIBLER, District Judge
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage

prepaid, this

/3%day

of April, 2009, to the following:

James E. Siebe
Siebe Law Offices
202 E. Second St.
P.O. Box 9045
Moscow, ID 83843
E?j

b

Rami Amaro
Special Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 796
Hayden, ID 83835
MICHELE REYNOLDS, Clerk of Court
By:
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the State of ldaho in any appeal from a hearing officer's dedsion in ldaho
Transportation Department District 1 filed pursuant to the authority of ldaho Code § 188002%. Automatic License Suspension Program.
This letter of appointment will be included in the files of any court case, hearing, or other
matter in which she represents the State of ldaho in these appeals. This appointment is
effective through December 31,2009.
Any courtesies you can extend to Ms. Servick in her conduct of business for the State of
Idaho, as my delegate, will be appreciated.
Sincerely.

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400, FAX: (208)854-8071
Located at 700 W. State Street
Joe R. Williams Building, 2nd Floor
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IN TJ32 DISTRICT COURT OF TEE FIRST JWICIAL DISTMCT OF TEE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEPXAH
BRITT COLLEEN BURTON,
Petitioner,

1
j
)

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
)
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, ) Case No. CV-2007-461
)
Respondent.
) NOTICE OF APPEAL
BMTT COLLEEN BURTON,

)

Appellant,
VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
)
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, )
)
Respondent.
)

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT (SPECIAL DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL) AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
1.

The above-named Appellant, BRITT COLLEEN BURTON, appeals

against the Idaho Transportation Department, to the Supreme Court of the State of
Idaho, from the final agency decision dated September 20, 2007, upholding
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Ms. Burton's license suspension, and the District Court's Opinion and Order Re:
Appeal, affirming the decision, entered by the Honorable Fred M. Gibler on April 10,
2009 and served on appellant's counsel on April 13,2009.

2.

The party has a right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Order

described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to
I.A.R. 1l(f).
3.

The preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which the appellant

then intends to assert in the appeal is as follows: there was no lawful basis for the stop
preceding the evidentiary test giving rise to the Administrative License Suspension
imposed upon Appellant.
However, pursuant to I.A.R. 17(f), this preliminary statement of the issue to be
appealed does not prevent appellant from asserting other issues on appeal.

4.

Appellant requests preparation of the Court Clerk's Record. Appellant

will pay the balance of the fees for preparation upon receipt of said estimate. The
necessary transcripts and record for the appeal to District Court have been prepared
and Appellant has paid the fees for preparation thereof, and this matter was submitted
without argument, so Appellant anticipates the record will be de minimis in size.

5.

Appellant requests that no additional documents be included in the

clerk's record other than those automatically included under I.A.R. 28.

6.

Counsel certifies by his signature hereunder that service of this Notice

of Appeal has been made upon the reporter of the Honorable Fred M. Gibler, District
Judge, that the $100 estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid
concurrently with the filing of this Notice, that counsel will mail the fee for
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preparation of any transcript if ally such estimate is received, and that service has
been made upon all other parties required to be served pursuant to I.A.R. 20.

DATED this 22nd day of May, 2009.
SIEBE LAW OFFICES

B
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

( ) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered

Driver Services
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1 129

( ) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( p m i g h t Mail
( Facsimile (208) 332-4 124

Honorable Fred M. Gibler
P.O. Box 527
Wallace, ID 83873

( ) U.S. Mail
Delivered
ernight Mail
( Facsimile (208) 753-358 1
/( &.s. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Byrl Cinnamon
P.O. Box 2821
Hayden, ID 83835
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SUPREME COURT N0.36540-2009
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I, CAROLN RYAN, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Benewah, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record in the
above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and
contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers
designated to be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any
Notice of Cross-Appeal, and any additional documents requested to be
included.
I further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and
pictures offered or admitted as exhibits in the above entitled cause, if
any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court with any
Reporterfs Transcript and the Clerkfs Record (except for the exhibits
which are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by
Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

CLERKfS CERTIFICATE

IN WITNESS WI-IEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of said Court at St. Maries, Idaho this za- + A day of June, 2009.

J. MICHELE REYNOLDS
Clerk of the District Court

By:
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I, CAROL RYAN, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Benewah, do hereby certify:
That the following is a list of exhibits to the Record that
have been used as evidence in this cause:

COURT'S EXHIBITS

DESCRIPTION

1

ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

THERE

NO REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS LODGED IN THIS CASE.

I do further certify that all exhibits in the above entitled
cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with
the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
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J. MICHELE REYNOLDS
Clerk of t h e D i s t r i c t Court

By:

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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